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Abstract
This article investigates the properties of social choice functions (SCFs) that represent resource allocation strategies for
interference coupled wireless systems. The resources can be physical layer parameters such as power vectors or spatial
streams. Strategy proofness and eﬃciency properties of SCFs are used to capture the properties of non-manipulability
and Pareto optimality of resource allocation strategies, respectively. This article introduces and investigates the
concepts of (strong) intuitive fairness and non-participation in interference coupled systems. The analysis indicates
certain inherent limitations when designing strategy proof and eﬃcient resource allocation strategies, if additional
desirable and intuitive properties are imposed. These restrictions are investigated in an analytical mechanism design
framework for interference coupled wireless systems. The article also investigates the permissible SCFs, which can be
implemented by a mechanism in either Nash equilibrium or dominant strategy for utility functions representing
interference coupled wireless systems. Among other results, it is shown that a strategy proof and eﬃcient resource
allocation strategy cannot simultaneously satisfy continuity and the often encountered property of non-participation.
Introduction
From the evolution of wireless infrastructure from second
generation to third generation, there has been a gradual
transition from voice centric to data centric applications.
Many of these applications are quality of service (QoS)
based. AQoS application typically requires users to report
their channel qualities to a central controller. The ven-
dors manufacturing end user equipment have an incentive
to report a higher channel quality, than the true channel
quality experienced by the user. Such a misrepresenta-
tion of the channel quality is motivated by the vendor’s
intention of over provisioning for its users. There can be
other instances, where the users have an incentive to mis-
represent their measured channel quality or interference
temperature. The result of solving a resource allocation
problem with misrepresented utilities is that the out-
come might not always be the one desired by the central
controller, e.g., base station, operator. Such a misrepre-
sentation of utilities can have an undesirable eﬀect on the
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resource allocation. Being in a position to tackle such a
misrepresentation helps in better formulation of the opti-
mization problem for radio resource allocation in wireless
networks.
Expecting the resource allocation strategy to be strategy
proof could be one possible solution to the central con-
troller’s dilemma of solving an optimization problem with
misrepresented utilities. Much of previous strategy proof-
ness literature in wireless network has been motivated
from the perspective, that the users might have a motiva-
tion and ability to misrepresent their utilities (refer to the
networks-related literature in “Literature survey” section).
We utilize the social choice function (SCF) to rep-
resent resource allocation strategies in interference
coupled wireless systems. The goals of the designed
resource allocation strategies can be viewed in terms
of social choice, which is simply an aggregation of
the preferences of the diﬀerent users toward a sin-
gle joint decision. The diﬀerence of interest between
the operator and users is one example in networks,
where the theory of mechanism design can be utilized.
© 2012 Boche et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
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Mechanism design attempts implementing desired social
choices in a strategic setting, assuming that the diﬀer-
ent members of society act rationally in a game theoretic
sense [1].
We utilize an axiomatic framework for SCFs (discussed
in detail in “SCFs” section). An SCF represents a resource
allocation strategy in interference coupled wireless sys-
tems. In our abstraction, if an SCF satisﬁes a particular
axiom, then the resource allocation strategy is said to sat-
isfy the property corresponding to the axiom. We capture
the non-manipulation of the resource allocation strategy
by the property of strategy proofness of the SCF. An exam-
ple of a strategy proof SCF is the second price auction
(Vickrey Clarke Groves auction). Pareto optimality of the
resource allocation strategy is captured by the property of
eﬃciency. This article studies such and certain other desir-
able properties of SCFs representing resource allocation
strategies.
We consider resource sets beyond pure exchange
economies. The only constraint on our resource sets is
that they satisfy the signal-to-interference plus noise ratio
(SINR)-based utility (SBU) function framework (see “Util-
ity modeling” section). This article provides certain new
insights on a particular class of strategy proof and eﬃ-
cient resource allocation strategies and has the following
main contributions (see “Analysis: properties of resource
allocation strategies” section):
1 We introduce the property of intuitive fairness (see
“SCFs” section). Intuitive fairness implies that if a
particular user scales down its demand for utility,
then the other users must obtain the same or better
utility. For strong intuitive fairness, the users can
choose from a family of utility functions.
(a) A strategy proof and eﬃcient resource
allocation strategy, which satisﬁes the
property of intuitive fairness (see Deﬁnition
6) is robust to a particular user’s scaling down
of the utility, when the utilities of all other
users are ﬁxed.
(b) A strategy proof and eﬃcient resource
allocation strategy, satisfying either intuitive
fairness (see Deﬁnition 6) or strong intuitive
fairness (see Deﬁnition 7), can be altered only
if two or more users change their utilities, i.e.,
the resource allocation strategy is robust to
the change in utilities of any singular user.
(c) If a strategy proof and eﬃcient resource
allocation strategy is not constant with
respect to the utility of a user k, then another
user j (j = k) experiences a measurable
decrease in its performance, even if this other
user j’s utility function is ﬁxed.
2 We introduce the property of non-participation,
which says that if a particular user does not demand
any utility, then it obtains no resource.
A strategy proof and eﬃcient resource allocation
strategy for interference coupled systems cannot
simultaneously satisfy continuity and the property of
non-participation. Continuity is a desirable property
of resource allocation strategies for designing
practical algorithms and for mathematical
tractability. Hence, this result proves to be an
impossibility result, i.e., a strategy proof, eﬃcient,
and non-participation resource allocation strategies
are discontinuous.
3 Let a mechanism implement an SCF in Nash
equilibrium. Then, there exists a “point” in the set of
physical layer resources, such that the SCF chooses
this point for all possible utility functions in the
family of SBU functions. A similar result can be
proved for dominant strategy implementation.
4 A resource allocation strategy is strategy proof, if and
only if the SINR function γk for a particular user k is
a constant function, independent of its own utility
uk . The constant mentioned in the previous sentence
depends on the utility functions of the other users.
There has been a signiﬁcant amount of economic lit-
erature on this topic. We give a brief overview of this
literature in “Literature survey” section. It can be observed
from the literature that previous work in networks and
communication theory has typically focused on the design
of strategy proof resource allocation strategies for par-
ticular wireless or communication systems. This article
characterizes certain boundaries while designing strategy
proof and eﬃcient resource allocation strategies, when
combined with certain desirable and intuitive proper-
ties. We investigate these contradictions in the framework
of interference coupled wireless systems and an analyt-
ical framework of mechanism design, described in the
following section.
Analytical framework
In this article, we shall investigate the case of interfer-
ence coupled wireless systems, beyond pure exchange
economies. Before we begin to describe our systemmodel
and present the relevant deﬁnitions, we provide certain
notational conventions used in the article in the next
section.
Preliminaries and notation
Matrices and vectors are denoted by bold capital letters
and bold lowercase letters, respectively. Let y be a vec-
tor, then yl =[ y]l is the lth component. Let y−l denote
the vector y without the lth component. Likewise Gmn =
[G]mn is a component of the matrix G. The notation
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y ≥ 0 implies that yl ≥ 0 for all components l. x  y
implies component-wise inequality with strict inequality
for at least one component. Similar deﬁnitions hold for the
reverse directions. x = y implies that the vector diﬀers in
at least one component. Let Y denote a set of vectors and
denote a family (class) of functions or tuples. We use yk
for indexing of individual components of vectors and indi-
vidual components of tuples of functions, where yk ∈ Yk .
Let YK =: ×k∈KYk unless otherwise speciﬁed. The set of
non-negative real numbers and positive real numbers are
denoted as R+ and as R++, respectively.
Interference coupled wireless systems
In a wireless system, the users’ utilities can strongly
depend on the underlying physical layer. An important
measure for the link performance in cellular and ad hoc
wireless networks is the SINR. SINR is also utilized as
a performance indicator in the standardization commu-
nity. Hence, results pertaining to such a model could
help investigate the limitations of SINR-based communi-
cation systems. Consider K users with transmit powers
p =[ p1, . . . , pK ]T and K := {1, . . . ,K}. The noise power
at each receiver is σ 2. Hence, the SINR at each receiver






⎦ = [p1, . . . , pK , σ 2]T . (1)
The resulting SINR of user k is
SINRk(p) = pkIk(p) = γk(p), (2)
where Ik is the interference (plus noise) as a function of
p. In order to model interference coupling, we shall fol-
low the axiomatic approach proposed in [2,3]. The general
interference functions possess the properties of condi-
tional positivity, scale invariance, and monotonicity with
respect to the power component and strict monotonicity
with respect to the noise component. For further details,
kindly refer to the Appendix.
Utility modeling
In mathematical economics, the modeling of users’ utili-
ties is an initial step toward characterizing the preferences
of the users and in turn utilizing the framework of mech-
anism design and implementation theory. In our system
model, each user can choose its own utility function. For
a user, announcing its true utilities to the operator might
not be in its best interest, i.e., the users can choose to
reveal a utility function, which diﬀers from their true
utility functions, so as to obtain more utility.
Generally, it is not possible to accurately communicate
a non-parametric utility function in an Euclidean space.
However, for the purpose of obtaining certain initial intu-
ition on the topic we have not concerned ourselves with
this issue. For a practical implementation we can uti-
lize approximations, e.g., a parametrization, where one
could transmit a scalar and choose a function from a look
up table based on the transmitted scalar or transmission
of a ﬁnite number of scalars (based on the system con-
straints, e.g., bandwidth, time duration of block fading,
etc.), which represent coeﬃcients of a polynomial utilized
to approximate the utility function. Scalar parameterized
mechanisms have been discussed in [4].
We are particularly interested in analyzing the class of
utility functions, which are functions of the SINR, given
by (2). The utility functions, which shall be introduced
in Deﬁnition 1, are motivated based on the below two
factors.
• Users in a wireless system are coupled by interference.
• Performance indicators in wireless systems are
inﬂuenced by physical layer parameters.
Deﬁnition 1. For user k, uk is said to be an SBU function,
if there exists a strictly monotonic, increasing and contin-




) = q(γk(p)). (3)
Remark 1. Let u =[u1, . . . ,uK ]∈ UK , where UK is the
family of SBU functions for K users.
In this article, “utility” can represent certain arbitrary
performance measures, which depend on the SINR by a
strictly monotonic, increasing, and continuous function q
deﬁned on R+. The utility of user k is
uk(p) = q(γk(p)), k ∈ K. (4)
An example of the above case is capacity: q(x) = log(1+
x) and eﬀective bandwidth q(x) = x/(1 + x) [5]. The
same theory can be developed for strictly monotonic,
decreasing, and continuous functions qˆ. For the follow-
ing performance indicators, we would like tominimize the
objective function, e.g., mean square error : qˆ(x) = 1/(1+
x), BER: qˆ(x) = Q(√x), and high-SNR approximation of
BER qˆ(x) = x−α with diversity order α.
Analytical framework: SCFs andmechanism design
In this section, we review certain mechanism design and
implementation theoretic notation [6], in the context of
interference coupled systems. We assume that the num-
ber of users K ≥ 2. Let R be an arbitrary set of out-
comes at the physical layer. Let R := ×k∈KRk and rk ∈
Rk . Resources at the physical layer are power, antenna
weights, spatial streams, etc. A combination of these could
also be considered as resources and modeled by our
framework.
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Example 1. Consider a SIMO uplink scenario with a total
power constraint or a MISO downlink scenario with a
total power constraint Ptotal and beamforming vectors for
the users being ωk , with k ∈ K. The set of resourcesR can
be represented in this scenario as follows.
R = {(p,ω1, . . . ,ωK ) | p ≥ 0,
∑
k∈K
pk ≤ Ptotal, ‖ω1‖2
= · · · = ‖ωK‖2 = 1}.
(5)
Let r =[ r1, . . . , rK ]. A result is said to be presented for
the case of pure exchange economies, if the resource set is
deﬁned as follows:
R = {r ∈ RK+ |
∑
k∈K
rk ≤ C,C ∈ R+}. (6)
As mentioned in the “Introduction” section, in this arti-
cle we analyze the case of interference coupled wireless
systems, beyond pure exchange economies.
SCFs
Each user k has a preference relation deﬁned over the set
of outcomes R, which admits a numerical representation
uk : R → R+.
Remark 2. As has been observed earlier in this article, the
set of outcomes R is the set of resources, which could be
the set of power P . In this special case, where power allo-
cation is an outcome, we have that the particular power
vector p ∈ P .
Example 2. Consider the case, when the users report
their utility functions to a central controller, e.g., base
station. Based on a system objective (an SCF), the base
station allocates resources to the users. Based on the allo-
cated resources, the users derive their own performance,
e.g., QoS level.
Diﬀerent users in a wireless system could have diﬀer-
ent preferences depending on their resource allocation
strategy. We shall utilize the SCF to characterize resource
allocation strategies. If a particular property (axiom) is
satisﬁed by the SCF, then the corresponding property is
satisﬁed by the resource allocation strategy, i.e., we utilize
certain properties (axioms) to emulate desirable proper-
ties of resource allocation strategies.
An SCF aggregates the preferences of all the users into
a social choice for the entire system, i.e., the resource
allocation strategy.
Deﬁnition 2. An SCF is a function f : UK → R (i.e., f is
an injective function) that associates with every u ∈ UK a
unique outcome f (u) inR.
We now clarify that what we mean by a strategy K-tuple
and a strategy set. A strategy is a complete contingent plan
or decision rule that says what a user will do at each of its
information sets. Let Sk be the strategy set of a user k ∈ K
andSK := ×k∈KSk be the strategy set of the set of usersK.
We now present certain well-known desired properties of
SCFs. We shall revisit strategy K-tuples and strategy sets,
when we deal withmechanisms and implementation theo-
retic concepts in “Mechanism design and implementation
theoretic concepts” section.
Review of extant properties of SCFs
We formalize certain desirable properties of resource allo-
cation strategies by means of an axiomatic framework
for SCFs to capture these properties. In this article, we
are interested in exploring the interplay between the
axiomatic framework and the implementation of resource
allocation strategies.
Example 3. Consider for two users an SCF f (see
Equation 7). We analyze the case for linear interference
functions and for a total power constraint Ptotal. Then we
have that γ1(p) = p1v12p2+σ 2 and γ2(p) =
p2
v21p1+σ 2 , where
v12 and v21 are the normalized coupling between user 1
and 2. Let the utility sets for the users be as follows:
U (1) = {ω1 log(γ1(p))}; U (2) = {ω2 log(γ2(p))},
where [ω1,ω2]= ω > 0. Let us choose the following f :
f (ω) = argmax
s:es1+es2≤Ptotal
(
ω1 log γ1(es)+ω2 log γ2(es)
)
, (7)
where s =[ s1, s2], p = es such that pk ∈ p, pk = esk and
Ptotal is the total power constraint on the system for 2 users
(see Figure 1b). The function ω1 log γ1(es) + ω2 log γ2(es)
is strictly convex and bounded. Therefore, there exists
a unique optimizer, i.e., the function f is a well-deﬁned
SCF. From (7) we can see that a user has an incentive to
misrepresent its utility function.
By misrepresenting its utility function, a user can
manipulate the outcome of a resource allocation strat-
egy. Avoiding such behavior is a desired property from
the perspective of an operator or a regulator. The prop-
erty, that a particular resource allocation strategy is non-
manipulable, is emulated by the SCF f satisfying the prop-
erty strategy proofness. The following two deﬁnitions can
also be found in [7].
Deﬁnition 3. An SCF f is said to be strategy proof, if for all
users k ∈ K and for all utility functions uk , uˆk ∈ U , ∀uˆ−k ∈
UK−1, we have that uk(f (uk , uˆ−k)) ≥ uk(f (uˆk , uˆ−k)).
An SCF is said to be strategy proof if the users have
no incentive to misrepresent their utilities to the central
controller.
Deﬁnition 4. An SCF f is eﬃcient if ∀u ∈ UK ,
1. there is no r ∈ R such that uk(r) ≥ uk(f (u)) for all
users k ∈ K, and
2. uk(r) > uk(f (u)) for some user k ∈ K.
Eﬃciency from the point of view of wireless communica-
tion (physical layer perspective) of the resource allocation
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Figure 1 Depiction of a the set of resourcesP and the QoS setQ2 for the case of 2 users in a wireless system. (a) Set of resources for two
users. In this case, the set of powers permitted by the power constraints for the two users. (b) SINR region corresponding to the set of powers, with
the transformation γ = γ (p). (c) QoS region after the transformation of the SINR region via the utility function mapping u(p) = q(γ (p)).
strategies implies choosing an operating point on the
Pareto boundary of the feasible utility region [8].
Deﬁnition 5. The option set of a user k ∈ K, given a utility
function (K − 1)-tuple u−k ∈ UK−1, is the set
Qk(u−k) = {r ∈ R | ∃uk ∈ U , such thatf (uk ,u−k) = r}
(8)
where r is a resource vector.
The option set Qk is the set of resources for all the users,
which user k can inﬂuence with its utility function, given
the utility function (K − 1)-tuples u−k ∈ UK−1. The use
of option sets has proved to be a useful technique in ana-
lyzing strategy proof SCFs [9]. The reader should bear in
mind that option sets are relative to a given function on a
given domain, even if this is not explicit in the notation.
We shall now present certain new properties, which are
quite natural from a wireless system perspective.
Introduced properties of SCFs
In this section, we introduce the properties of (strong)
intuitive fairness and non-participation and connect them
with certain well established concepts in literature.
Deﬁnition 6. An SCF f is said to satisfy the property of
intuitive fairness, if for all utility function K-tuples u ∈
UK , for all user k ∈ K we have that, for arbitrarily chosen
(uk ,u−k) and 0 < λ < 1, uk(f (λuj,u−j)) ≥ uk(f (uj,u−j)),
k ∈ K, k = j.
An SCF is said to be intuitive fair, if for all users k ∈ K,
we have the case, that if any user linearly scales down
its utility, then the other users should either obtain the
same or better utility as in the case, when the user had
not scaled its utility. Deﬁnition 6 is similar to the axiom
of population monotonicity (in the context of coopera-
tive bargaining theory [10]) introduced under a diﬀerent
name in [11]. The axiom of populationmonotonicity states
the following. Suppose a group of users K1 have arrived
to play a particular resource allocation game. If the users
K2\K1 (with K1 ⊂ K2) do not show up, let the set of
users K1 reach a particular solution outcome. If the users
K2\K1 show up afterwards, resource allocation is carried
out again and no user in K1 should be better oﬀ.
Now, we allow the user to possess the ability of not only
scaling its utility function, but also choosing other utility
functions altogether.
Deﬁnition 7. An SCF f is said to satisfy the property of
strong intuitive fairness, if for all users k ∈ K, for all utility
function (K − 1)-tuples u−k ∈ UK−1, uk , uˆk ∈ U and for
0 ≤ uˆk(r) ≤ uk(r) for all r ≥ 0, we have that
uk(f (uˆj,u−j)) ≥ uk(f (uj,u−j)), k ∈ K\j.
In the deﬁnition of strong intuitive fairness it can be
seen that the utility function uˆk is dominated by the util-
ity function uk , for all users k ∈ K, for all resource vectors
r ∈ R, and all utility function (K − 1)-tuples u−k ∈ UK−1.
Remark 3. The SCF f presented in Example 3 satisﬁes the
properties of eﬃciency and strong intuitive fairness.
The properties of intuitive fairness and strong intu-
itive fairness are somehow connected to the property of
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min–max fairness. For any resource allocation strategy
providing QoS to the users we can associate a speciﬁc
notion of fairness. The consideration of fairness notions
has mainly been a wired network issue [12,13]. The most
common fairness notion is min–max fairness. It repre-
sents an equilibrium associated with an ideal social system
characterized by the fact that no user’s QoS measure can
be increased without decreasing an already lower user’s
QoS measure.
Example 4. In the framework of interference coupled















where qreqk describes the QoS requirement of the kth user
and γ (req)k the corresponding SINR threshold. V is the link
gain matrix for the interference coupled wireless system.
Fortunately, in cellular wireless networks the intricacies
associated with the so-called bottleneck connections are
nonexistent. Under non-existing or equal QoS require-
ments themin–max fair power allocation equalizes all link
QoSmeasures and represents the right eigen-vector of the
interference matrix.
Comparing min–max fairness to intuitive fairness, we
can see that if a particular user k reduces its demand for
utility, then there are more resources for the remaining
users. Hence, another user j ∈ K\k could increase its
utility without decreasing the utility of a userm ∈ K\{j, k}.
We now discuss another property of resource allocation
strategies, namely pointwise continuity. We say that the
sequence of functions {u(n)}n∈N, u(n) ∈ UK converges to
u ∈ UK , if for all constants Rtotal > 0, we have that
lim
n→∞ maxr≥0,∑k∈K rk≤Rtotal‖u
(n)(r) − u(r)‖l1 = 0.
The sequence of utility functions {u(n)k }n∈N are deﬁned
by their values, so the utility functions converge if their
values converge. This reduces the convergence of real-
valued functions to the convergence of real numbers. Such
a convergence is called pointwise convergence. We are
dealing with utility function K-tuples (K-tuple of util-
ity functions) as against utility functions. Hence, we use
the l − 1 norm. We would like at this point to remind
the reader that we say that an SCF f is continuous, if for




(n)) − f (u)‖l1 = 0.
We now explain a very natural property, which is almost
always satisﬁed for all resource allocation strategies occur-
ring in interference coupled wireless systems. The prop-
erty states that, if a particular user demands no utility,
then the resource allocation strategy does not allocate any
resource to this user.
Deﬁnition 8. An SCF f is said to satisfy the property of
non-participation, if for a given user k ∈ K and for all
utility function (K − 1)-tuples u−k ∈ UK−1, we have that
fk(0,u−k) = 0.
Remark 4. In practical wireless networks it must be
noted that if a user requires no utility, i.e., it demands
no resources at a particular time instant, it still has to
utilize some resources to report its utility function to
the resource allocation agent (central controller). Hence,
the property of non-participation though seemingly intu-
itive and harmless could lead to certain restrictions for
resource allocation strategies, when it is expected to be
satisﬁed with certain other properties. This will displayed
in detail later in the proof of Theorem 3 (where the inter-
play of axioms of non-participation and continuity along
with strategy-proofness and eﬃciency is brought to light).
Equipped with the suitable notations and framework,
we present the results of our analysis in “Analysis: proper-
ties of resource allocation strategies” section.
Mechanism design and implementation theoretic concepts
In the previous section, we have seen that the SCF being
used as a tool to capture certain desirable properties of
resource allocation strategies in a wireless system. We
shall now like to shift our focus to investigating the imple-
mentation aspects of resource allocation strategies in a
wireless network. For this purpose, we shall utilize the the-
ory of mechanism design and implementation theory. We
begin by introducing themechanism below.
Deﬁnition 9. Amechanism is a function g : SK → R that
assigns to every strategy K-tuple s ∈ SK a unique element
r ∈ R.
A mechanism is a procedure for determining outcomes.
Who gets to choose the mechanism, i.e., who is mecha-
nism designer depends on the scenario in question, e.g.,
base station, operator, regulator, etc.
Example 5. Consider an example, where the resources at
the physical layer are only the powers of the users, i.e.,
R = P , with P the set of powers deﬁned as follows:
P = {p | ∑k∈K pk ≤ Ptotal} and the utility function is
deﬁned by (4). With this scenario, Figure 1 displays the
concepts of an SCF f , the set of outcomes P and the set of
utilities UK .
Let g(Sk , s−k) be the attainable set of user k at s−k , i.e.,
the set of outcomes that user k can induce when the other
users select s−k . For k ∈ K, uk ∈ Uk and a resource vector
r ∈ R, let L(r,uk) = {rˆ ∈ R | uk(r) ≥ uk(rˆ)} be the weak
lower contour set of user k with uk at resource vector r.
Deﬁnition 10. Given a mechanism g : SK → R, the
strategy proﬁle s∗ ∈ SK is a Nash equilibrium of g at
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u ∈ UK , if and only if for all users k ∈ K and for all
(K − 1)-strategy tuples s−k ∈ Sk we have that
uk(g(sk , s∗−k)) ≤ uk(g(s∗k , s∗−k)). (9)
The Nash equilibrium of a mechanism can also be char-
acterized in terms of theweak lower contour set as follows.
Given a mechanism g : SK → R, the strategy proﬁle
s ∈ SK is aNash equilibrium of g at u ∈ UK if for all k ∈ K,
g(Sk , s−k) ⊆ L(g(s),uk). Let Ng(u) be the set of Nash
equilibria of the mechanism g at utility function tuple
u. We now introduce the corresponding implementation
theoretic concept of Nash equilibrium implementation.
Deﬁnition 11. The mechanism g implements the SCF f
in Nash equilibrium, if for each utility function K-tuple
u ∈ UK , the following condition is fulﬁlled.
• For any strategy K-tuple s ∈ Ng(u), g(s) = f (u).
Hence, there exists a strategy K-tuple s ∈ Ng(u) such that
g(s) = f (u).
The SCF f isNash implementable if there exists a mech-
anism that implements f in Nash equilibria. The second
condition in Deﬁnition 11 ensures that irrespective of the
choice of the strategy K-tuple in the set Ng(u), we always
obtain the same outcome in the set of outcomes, namely
f (u). Such a requirement is essential for implementation,
since otherwise, we would not be in a position to charac-
terize the properties of the SCF f. We now turn to another
concept in game theory and mechanism design, namely
that of strategic dominance, i.e., a particular strategy sk is
“better” than another strategy sˆk for a particular user k ∈
K, independent of the other users j ∈ K\k strategies s−k .
Even though, the concept of dominant strategy is some-
times thought of as a simpliﬁcation [14], it is still a useful
analytical and practical tool to investigate mechanisms
and resource allocation strategies.
Deﬁnition 12. The strategy sk ∈ Sk is a dominant strat-
egy for user k ∈ K of g at utility function uk ∈ Uk if
for all strategy (K − 1)-tuples sˆ−k ∈ SK−1, g(Sk , sˆ−k) ⊆
L(g(sk , sˆ−k),uk).
Let DSgk(uk) be the set of dominant strategies for user
k of mechanism g at utility function uk . The strategy K-
tuple s ∈ SK is a dominant strategy equilibrium of g at
utility K-tuple u ∈ UK if for all users k ∈ K, sk ∈ DSgk(uk).
Let DSg(u) be the set of dominant strategy equilibria of
mechanism g at utility K-tuple u.
Example 6. In the context of wireless systems, the authors
of [15] show that with an appropriately designed down-
link scheduler the socially optimal uplink rate allocation
emerges as a dominant strategy for all users.
Deﬁnition 13. The mechanism g implements the SCF f
in dominant strategy equilibria if for each utility K-tuple
u ∈ UK ,
1. there exists a strategy K-tuple s ∈ DSg(u) such that
g(s) = f (u) and
2. for any strategy K-tuple s ∈ DSg(u), g(s) = f (u).
Remark 5. The SCF f is dominant strategy implementable
if there exists a mechanism that implements f in dominant
strategy equilibria.
Themechanism g is called a direct revelationmechanism
associated with the SCF f if S = U for all k ∈ K and
g(u) = f (u) for all u ∈ UK .We do not distinguish between
the SCF f and the direct revelation mechanism associ-
ated with the SCF f. While analyzing the implementation
aspects in “Nash implementation and dominant strategy
implementation” section, when we say the SCF f, we also
mean the direct revelation mechanism g associated with
the SCF f.
Analysis: properties of resource allocation
strategies
For certain interference coupled wireless scenarios we
would like to characterize resource allocation strate-
gies, which satisfy certain desirable properties from the
axiomatic framework, which can be implemented using
mechanisms (see Figure 2).
We shall present following results in this section.
1. Results pertaining to desired properties of resource
allocation strategies captured by SCFs (see sections
“Nash implementation and dominant strategy
implementation”, “Intuitive fairness and strong
intuitive fairness SCFs”, and “Non-participation and
continuity properties of SCFs” sections.
2. Results pertaining to Nash equilibrium

























Figure 2 Abstraction: Investigation of the possibility of
obtaining implementable resource allocation strategies
satisfying certain desirable axioms. The left hand side of the ﬁgure
displays axioms representing desirable properties of resource
allocation strategies. The right hand side of the ﬁgure gives examples
of possible implementation solutions.
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implementation of resource allocation strategies in a
wireless network based on a SINR physical layer
model (see “Nash implementation and dominant
strategy implementation” section).
Non-manipulable and eﬃcient SCFs
We begin by presenting a result, which states the follow-
ing. An SCF f is strategy proof, if and only if for all users
k ∈ K, the outcome of the resource allocation for the
kth user, i.e., γk(r) is a constant, which is independent
of its own utility function uk ∈ U . However, this con-
stant is dependent on the utility functions u1, . . . ,uk−1,
uk+1, . . . ,uK , i.e., the utilities of the other users u−k .
Theorem 1. An SCF f is strategy proof, if and only if for
all users k ∈ K and for all utility function (K − 1)-tuples
u−k ∈ UK−1, there exists a constant ck(u−k) > 0 such
that for all resource vectors r ∈ Qk(u−k), γk(r) = ck(u−k),
where γk is the SINR function of the kth user.
Proof. “=⇒”: Assume that the SCF f is strategy proof.
Let there be an arbitrary user k ∈ K and an utility function
(K−1)-tuple u−k ∈ UK−1 also chosen arbitrarily but ﬁxed.
Then, for utility functions uk , uˆk ∈ U chosen arbitrarily,
we have that
uk(f (uk ,u−k)) ≥ uk(f (uˆk ,u−k)).
Since, γk is a special case of our utility function, the
above expression follows from strategy proofness. Then
γk(f (uk ,u−k)) ≥ γk(f (uˆk ,u−k)). However, due to strategy
proofness, we also have
uˆk(f (uˆk ,u−k)) ≥ uˆk(f (uk ,u−k))
γk(f (uˆk ,u−k)) ≥ γk(f (uk ,u−k)).
Then, γk(f (uˆk ,u−k)) = γk(f (uk ,u−k)) = ck(u−k). Since
we have chosen the utility function uˆk ∈ U arbitrarily, we
have for all resource vectors r ∈ Qk(u−k) that γk(r) =
ck(u−k).
“⇐=”: Let us choose a user k ∈ K arbitrarily. Let u−k ∈
UK−1 be an arbitrarily chosen (but ﬁxed) utility function
(K − 1)-tuple. Let uk , uˆk ∈ U be chosen arbitrarily. Then,
we have that
γk(f (uk ,u−k)) = γk(f (uˆk ,u−k))
uk(f (uk ,u−k)) = u˜k(γk(f (uk ,u−k)))
= u˜k(γk(f (uˆk ,u−k)))
= uk(f (uˆk ,u−k)). (10)
Equation 10 holds for all users k ∈ K. Hence, the SCF f
satisﬁes the property of strategy proofness.
We now present a result for the 2-user case. This result
shows the restriction of the available SCFs f, if we want
them to satisfy the properties of strategy proofness and
eﬃciency, i.e., the resource allocation strategy is non-
manipulable and is Pareto optimal.
Corollary 1. Let the number of users K = 2. Then SCF
f is eﬃcient and strategy proof, if and only if there exists
a resource vector r∗ ∈ R with γ (r∗) a Pareto optimal
resource allocation and for all utility function 2-tuples
(u1,u2) ∈ U2, we have that f (u1,u2) = r∗.
Proof. “=⇒”: We have the number of users K = 2. Let
SCF f be strategy proof and eﬃcient. For u2 ∈ U (u−1 =
u2) each resource r ∈ Q1(u−1) is on the Pareto boundary
(γ1(r), γ2(r)) of the SINR region. From the strategy proof-
ness of the SCF f, for all utility functions u1, uˆ1 ∈ U , we
have
f (u1,u2) = f (uˆ1,u2). (11)
Let us choose a utility function uˆ2 ∈ U for user 2
arbitrarily. Then, the following expressions hold.
f (u1,u2) = f (u1, uˆ2) (12)
f (uˆ1,u2) = f (uˆ1, uˆ2). (13)
Then from (11), (12), and (13) for the utility functions
u1, uˆ1,u2, uˆ2 chosen arbitrarily, we have that f (u1,u2) =
f (u1, uˆ2) = f (uˆ1, uˆ2). Hence, we have proved our desired
result.
“⇐=”: Can be easily proved.
The classical results [16,17] are for the case of pure
exchange economies. Our results are for the case of
beyond pure exchange economies for interference cou-
pled systems. Theorems 1 and 1 provide certain initial
intuition on the structure of strategy proof and eﬃcient
SCFs for the case of interference coupled systems. We
observe that the structure imposed by the SBU function
framework is quite restrictive. This structure is the basis
of the impossibility results presented in Theorems 2, 3, 4,
and 3.
Intuitive fairness and strong intuitive fairness SCFs
Here we present our results in relation to the restric-
tions obtained, when we try to obtain strategy proof and
eﬃcient resource allocation strategies, which satisfy the
property of either
• intuitive fairness or
• strong intuitive fairness.
We now present a result, which states the following: a
non-manipulable, eﬃcient, and intuitive fair resource allo-
cation strategy is independent of the downwards scaling
of the utility function uk ∈ U of a particular user k ∈ K,
when the utility function (K − 1)-tuple u−k ∈ UK−1
is ﬁxed, i.e., the resource allocation strategy is robust to
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downwards scaling of the utility function of a particu-
lar user, when the utility functions of all the other users
are ﬁxed.
Theorem 2. Let an SCF f be strategy proof and eﬃcient.
Then, the SCF f fulﬁlls the property of intuitive fair, if and
only if for all users k ∈ K, for all utility functions u ∈ UK
and for 0 < λ ≤ 1, we have that
uk(f (λuk ,u−k)) = uk(f (uk ,u−k)), 1 ≤ k ≤ K,
i.e., for 0 < λ ≤ 1 we have that f (λuk ,u−k) = f (uk ,u−k).
Proof. =⇒: Let SCF f be strategy proof, eﬃcient and not
a constant function. Let us assume that SCF f is intuitive
fair. Then, we have that for all users k ∈ K, for all utility
function K-tuples u ∈ UK for u(λ) = (λuk ,u−k), 0 < λ ≤
1 and for all users j ∈ K\k, we have that
uk(f (u(λ))) ≥ uk(f (u)).
Furthermore, we have that γk(f (u(λ))) ≥ γk(f (u)).
For user j we have from Theorem 1, that γk(f (u(λ))) =
γk(f (u)). Then, for r(λ) := f (u(λ)) we have that
uk(r(λ)) ≥ uk(f (u)) for k ∈ K. Since, SCF f is eﬃcient,
we must have that uk(r(λ)) = uk(f (u)) for k ∈ K.
⇐=: This direction can easily be veriﬁed. Let an SCF f
be strategy proof, eﬃcient and satisfy the following expres-
sion, for all users k ∈ K and λ ∈ (0, 1]:
uk(f (λuk ,u−k)) = uk(f (uk ,u−k))
i.e.,f (λuk ,u−k) = f (uk ,u−k).
Then, it can easily be observed that the SCF satisﬁes the
property of intuitive fairness.
Remark 6. The SCF f (ω) deﬁned according to (7) (in
Example 7) satisﬁes the properties of eﬃciency and intu-
itive fairness.
We now present a corollary to Theorem 2, which states
the following. Let a resource allocation strategy be non-
manipulable and eﬃcient. If the resource allocation strat-
egy is not robust to downward scaling of the utility func-
tion of a particular user k ∈ K, then at least one other user
j ∈ K\k pays the price with a decrease in its performance,
even if the utility functions u−k are ﬁxed.
Corollary 2. Let SCF f be strategy proof and eﬃcient. For
an arbitrarily chosen user k ∈ K, with uk ∈ U , u−k ∈
UK−1, and λˆ ∈ (0, 1), let
f (λˆuk ,u−k) = f (uk ,u−k). (14)
Then, there exists at least one user j ∈ K\k such that
uj(f (λˆuk ,u−k)) < uj(f (uk ,u−k)).
Proof. Let the assumptions of the corollary be true. Let
us assume that for all users k ∈ K, for all utility functions
uk ∈ U , for all utility function (K − 1)-tuples u−k ∈ UK−1
and for all j ∈ K\k with λ ∈ (0, 1) we have that
uj(f (λuk ,u−k)) ≥ uj(f (uk ,u−k)).
Since, the SCF f satisﬁes the axioms of strategy proofness
and eﬃciency, we have that
uj(f (λuk ,u−k)) = uj(f (uk ,u−k)), j ∈ K\k.
From Theorem 1 we have for an arbitrarily chosen user k,
that uk(f (λuk ,u−k)) = uk(f (uk ,u−k)). Furthermore, we
have that f (λuk ,u−k) = f (uk ,u−k) for 0 < λ < 1.
We now present certain results, in relation to the
stronger property of strong intuitive fairness.
Corollary 3. Let an SCF f be strategy proof and eﬃcient.
Then, the SCF f fulﬁlls the property of strong intuitive fair-
ness, if and only if for an arbitrary user k ∈ K, for all
j ∈ K\k with utility function (K − 1)-tuple u−k ∈ UK−1,
there exists a constant dk(u−k , j) such that for all resources
r ∈ Qk(u−k) we have that
uk(r) = dk(u−k , j).
Proof. “=⇒”: Let us choose a user k ∈ K arbitrarily.
We shall take the perspective of user k without any loss
of generality. Let us arbitrarily choose a utility function
(K − 1)-tuple u−k ∈ UK−1. We have to show that for util-
ity functions uk , uˆk ∈ U , the expression uk(f (uk ,u−k)) =
uk(f (uˆk ,u−k)) holds for all k ∈ K. Let us assume that there
exists a user k0, where k0 ∈ K\k, such that
uk0(f (uk ,u−k)) = uk0(f (uˆk ,u−k)).
We deﬁne u∗k(r) as follows:
u∗k(r) = max(uk(r), uˆk(r)).
The utility function u∗k is strictly monotonic increasing
and continuous. For all resource vectors r ∈ R, we have
that u∗k(r) ≥ uk(r) and u∗k(r) ≥ uˆk(r). Therefore, from the
property of intuitive fairness for all users j ∈ K\k, we have
that
uj(f (u∗k ,u−k)) ≤ uj(f (uk ,u−k)), j ∈ K\k,
γj(f (u∗k ,u−k)) ≤ γj(f (uk ,u−k)), j ∈ K\k.
From Theorem 1 we have that γk(f (u∗k ,u−k)) ≤
γk(f (uk ,u−k)). Since, SCF f is eﬃcient, we must have that
γk(f (u∗k ,u−k)) = γk(f (uk ,u−k)), for all k ∈ K. Therefore,
from Theorem 1, we have that f (u∗k ,u−k) = f (uk ,u−k).
We can have the same expression also for (u∗k ,u−k) and
(uˆk ,u−k). Then, for arbitrary utility functions uk , uˆk ∈ U
we have f (uk ,u−k) = f (uˆk ,u−k). We have proved the
desired result.
“⇐=”: Let us choose a strategy proof and eﬃcient SCF f .
Let, for an arbitrary user k ∈ K and for all other users j ∈
K\k with utility function (K−1)-tuple u−k ∈ UK−1, there
exists a constant dk(u−k , j) such that for each resource
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vector r ∈ Qk(u−k)we have that uk(r) = dk(u−k , j). Then,
it can easily be veriﬁed that the SCF f satisﬁes the property
of strong intuitive fairness.
From the above proof, we can obtain the following addi-
tional result. If a resource allocation strategy satisﬁes the
properties of strategy proofness, eﬃciency, and strong intu-
itive fairness, then changing the preference of a single user
is not suﬃcient to change the resource allocation, i.e., to
aﬀect a change in the resource allocation at least two users
must change their preferences or utility functions for the
desired resources.
Corollary 4. Let an SCF f be strategy proof and eﬃcient.
Then, the SCF f fulﬁlls the property of strong intuitive fair-
ness, if for all users k ∈ K and for all utility function
(K−1)-tuples u−k ∈ UK−1, we have that the cardinality of
the option setQk(uk) is equal to 1. Therefore, for any utility
functions uk , uˆk ∈ U we have f (uk ,u−k) = f (uˆk ,u−k).
Proof. The proof is contained in the proof of Theorem
3.
We have stated that for all utility function K-tuples
u−k ∈ Uk−1 and for all utility functions uk = 0 and for an
arbitrarily chosen user j ∈ K\k, we have that
inf
r∈Qk(u−k)
rk = infuk =0 fk((uk ,u−k)) > 0.
Theorem 4 has a certain connection to the axiom non-
dummy introduced in [18]. An SCF f is non-dummy, if
∀k ∈ K, ∃u ∈ UK and uˆk ∈ U , such that f (u) = f (uˆk ,u−k).
The non-dummy axiom states that each user can change
the outcome of the SCF by changing its utility function.
It guarantees every user the minimum right to aﬀect the
social decision. Then, we can say that a strategy proof,
eﬃcient, and strong intuitive fair resource allocation strat-
egy for interference coupled systems does not satisfy the
axiom non-dummy.
Non-participation and continuity properties of SCFs
In this section, we present a result, which states that if the
resource allocation strategy is non-manipulable, Pareto
optimal satisﬁes property of non-participation, then the
resource allocation strategy has to be discontinuous. This
has certain implications on the algorithmic implementa-
tion of resource allocation strategies. Furthermore, conti-
nuity is a desirable property for resource allocation strate-
gies, e.g., in certain classes of widely used games, the Nash
equilibrium is a continuous function of the game param-
eters, which follows from the implicit function theorem
[19].
Theorem 3. Let an SCF f be strategy proof and eﬃcient.
Then, the SCF f cannot simultaneously be continuous and
satisfy the property of non-participation.
Proof. Let an SCF f be strategy proof and eﬃcient. For
the sake of obtaining a contradiction, let us assume that
the SCF f is continuous and satisﬁes the property of non-
participation. Let us choose a user k ∈ K arbitrarily
and take the perspective of this user k, without any loss
in generality. Let us choose a utility function (K − 1)-
tuple u−k ∈ UK−1 arbitrarily. For all power vectors p ∈
Qk(u−k) we have that γk(p) = ck(u−k) > 0. Therefore,
pk
Ik(p) = ck(u−k), for all power vectors p ∈ Qk(u−k).








(0, σ 2k )
) = σ 2k Ik((0, 1))
= σ 2k μk > 0,
where 0 < μk = Ik
(
(0, 1)). For all power vectors




μk = Ik((0, 1)). Therefore, we have that the power vec-
tor pk ≥ ck(u−k)σ 2k λk , where λ ∈ (0, 1). Let u(λ)(p) =















Then, we have that
lim
λ→0 fk(u(λ)) = fk((0,u−k)) = 0. (16)
Equation 16 follows from the property of non-
participation (Deﬁnition 8), which we have assumed that
our SCF f satisﬁes (for the sake of obtaining a contradic-
tion). However, fk(u(λ)) ≥ ck(u−k)σ 2k μk > 0. As can be
observed that the constant ck(u−k)σ 2k μk is independent of
λ. Therefore, inf0<λ<1 fk(u(λ)) > 0, which is in contradic-
tion with (16). Hence, we have our desired contradiction,
which proves the result.
The SCF f (ω) deﬁned in (7) (in Example 3) satisﬁes the
properties of eﬃciency, continuity, and non-participation.
Another practical way of justifying the non-fulﬁllment
of the axiom of non-participation along with the other
axioms in practical resource allocation strategies is that in
practical resource allocation strategies a user always uti-
lizes certain resources, i.e., in practical resource allocation
strategies fk(0,u−k) = c for some constant c > 0. A simple
way to picture this is that even if the user decides to trans-
mit nothing, it would require some resource to sense the
channel or measure the interference temperature. Hence,
the constant c can be made arbitrarily small, however we
always have c > 0.
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Nash implementation and dominant strategy
implementation
In this section, we present certain results pertaining to
Nash equilibrium implementation and dominant strategy
implementation aspects for the class of SBU functions. In
this article, we have not concerned ourselves with exis-
tence and uniqueness issues of the Nash equilibrium. For
the purpose of analysis of this article, we assume that
these issues have been addressed. One such paper toward
this direction is [20]. We begin by presenting Lemma 1,
which characterizes the Nash equilibrium properties of a
strategy K-tuple.
Lemma 1. 1. Let u ∈ UK be a ﬁxed utility function
K-tuple. Let s ∈ Ng(u) be an arbitrary strategy
K-tuple. Then, we have for all utility function
K-tuples uˆ ∈ UK , that s ∈ Ng(uˆ).
2. Let u, uˆ ∈ UK be arbitrary utility function K-tuples.
Then, we have that Ng(u) = Ng(uˆ).
Proof. (1) Choose an arbitrary strategy K-tuple s ∈
Ng(u). Then, we have for all users k ∈ K, g(Sk , s−k) ⊆
L(g(s),uk), i.e., we have for all users k ∈ K and for all
s˜k ∈ Sk , q(γk(g(s˜k , s−k))) ≤ q(γk(g(sk , s−k))), i.e., we have
for all users k ∈ K and for all s˜k ∈ Sk , γk(g(s˜k , s−k)) ≤
γk(g(sk , s−k)). Let uˆk := qˆ · γk , for any k ∈ K. We have for
all users k ∈ K and for all s˜k ∈ Sk that uˆk(g(s˜k , s−k)) ≤
uˆk(g(sk , s−k)), i.e., s ∈ Ng(uˆ).
(2) We need simply to exchange the order of uˆ and u in
part (1) of the proof and we have the desired result.
A similar result as in the Nash equilibrium implementa-
tion developed in Lemma 1 can be proved for dominant
strategy implementation, i.e., for arbitrary u, uˆ ∈ UK , we
have that DSg(u) = DSg(uˆ). We shall now develop the
connection between the Nash equilibrium and an SCF
f , which can be implemented in Nash equilibrium and
between an SCF f and its dominant strategy implementa-
tion.
Theorem 4. An SCF f can be implemented in Nash equi-
librium, if and only if it is a constant function. Further-
more, an SCF f can be implemented in dominant strategy,
if and only if it is a constant function.
Proof. “=⇒”: We shall only prove the result for the ﬁrst
statement of the theorem. Let u(1),u(2) ∈ UK be arbi-
trary utility functions in the family of functions UK , where
u(1) =[u(1)1 , . . . ,u(1)K ] and u(2) =[u(2)1 , . . . ,u(2)K ]. Let s(1)
and s(2) be two strategy K-tuples such that s(1) ∈ Ng(u(1))
and s(2) ∈ Ng(u(2)). We have from Lemma 1 that s(1) ∈
Ng(u(2)). This gives us
f (u(2)) (a)= g(s(2)) (b)= f (u(1)). (17)
Equality (a) in (17) follows from condition 2 in Def-
inition 11 and equality (b) in (17) follows from s(1) ∈
Ng(u(1)).
“⇐=”: The other direction can easily be veriﬁed. The
proof for the second statement of the theorem can be
carried out in a similar manner.
We now compare Theorem 4 with Maskin’s result in [8].
Maskin’s result requires an SCF to satisfy the following
two properties: monotonicity and no-veto power. In [8], an
SCF f : UK → R satisﬁes Maskin’s monotonicity condi-
tion, if ∀r ∈ R and ∀u, uˆ ∈ UK , if r = f (u) and for all users
k ∈ K, ∀rˆ ∈ R if uk(r) ≥ uk(rˆ) implies uˆk(r) ≥ uˆk(rˆ),
then r = f (uˆ).
Transitioning to our case of SBU functions, let uk(r) ≥
uk(rˆ), for all k ∈ K and for some u ∈ UK . Then, from the
deﬁnition of SBU functions (Deﬁnition 1) we have γk(r) ≥




) ≥ uˆk(γk(rˆ)), for all users k ∈ K and for
all uˆ ∈ UK .
It can be observed that our class of SBU functions
always satisﬁes the monotoncity property of Maskin. On
the other hand, it does not satisfy the no-veto property
(see [8], p. 31). Furthermore, we analyze a smaller class of
utility functions, compared to the general class analyzed
by Maskin. Therefore, the domain for our SCFs is smaller
than the domain of SCFs for the results from Maskin.
Hence, the class of mechanisms which can implement our
SCF in Nash equilibria should potentially be larger. How-
ever, we observe from Theorem 4 that for the class of SBU
functions the only permitted mechanisms, which imple-
ment the SCF in Nash equilibria or dominant strategy are
constant functions.
Example 7. Consider a multiuser multiple access chan-
nel, with a beamforming array at the base station [21,22].
For ﬁxed channels, the optimal beamforming weight vec-
tors ωoptk for the kth user, with respect to maximiz-
ing γk(p,ωoptk )s can easily be calculated. The optimal
SINR for the kth user can be written as: γk(p,ωoptk ) =
pkhHk (σ 2I +
∑
j =k pjhjhHj )−1hk where pk , hk , and σ 2k are
the power, the channel vectors at the base station array
and the noise for the kth user, respectively. The interfer-
ence function for the kth user is, Ik(p) =
(hHk (σ 2I +∑
j =k,j∈K pjhjhHj )−1hk
)−1. The structure of the feasible
utility region depends on several factors, for instance,
the receiver strategy. For one set of beamformers ωk ,
∀k ∈ K corresponds to one particular utility region
U(Ptotal,ω) for ﬁxed channels, where ω =[ω1, . . . ,ωK ]
and Ptotal is the total power constraint. Let a mecha-
nism g implement f (γ ω
opt
1




K ) in Nash equilibria.
Then from Theorem 4 the only permitted solution is the
constant power allocation, i.e., a ﬁxed power vector.




All the work cited here is for the case of pure exchange
economies. Hurwicz [23] showed that there is no strat-
egy proof, eﬃcient, and individually rational mechanism
in 2 user 2 resource pure exchange economy. The authors
of [24] attempted to replace individual rationality in Hur-
wicz’s result with a weaker axiom of non-dictatorship.
Ameliorating upon both results, Zhou [25] established an
impossibility result that there is no strategy proof, eﬃ-
cient, and non-dictatorialmechanism in 2 userm resource
(m ≥ 2) pure exchange economies. He conjectures that
there are no strategy proof, eﬃcient, and non-inversely dic-
tatorialmechanisms in the case of 3 ormore users. In [26],
Zhou’s conjecture has been examined and a new class of
strategy proof and eﬃcientmechanisms in the case of four
or more users (operators) was discovered.
The studies by the authors of [18,27] provided examples
of strategy proof, eﬃcient, and non-dictatorial SCFs. These
SCFs are also non-dummy. When we have four or more
users, two-stage dictator making mechanisms are strategy
proof, eﬃcient, and non-dummy. When we have three or
more users, the SCFs provided by Satterthwaite and Son-
nenschein [27] are strategy proof and eﬃcient. When we
have four ormore users, Kato andOhseto [18] have shown
existence of certain strategy proof, eﬃcient, non-dummy,
and dictatorial SCFs.
The property of strategy proofness requiring revealing
of a users’ preference is a dominant strategy. However,
as can be seen from the previous results, this con-
cept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strat-
egy proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibrium,
some of which produce undesired outcomes. A possi-
ble solution to this problem is to require double imple-
mentation in Nash equilibrium and in dominant strate-
gies. Saijo et al. [6] characterize securely implementable
SCF and compare their results with dominant strategy
implementations. Reichelstein and Reiter [28] discuss
the realization and implementation of a social choice
rule. It is shown that Nash implementation is always at
least as costly, in message space size, as (decentralized)
realization.
Networks literature survey
Our reference list is by no means comprehensive and
the interested reader is further referred to the references
in the mentioned papers. The studies of [29,30] intro-
duce the concept of a progressive second price auction.
Lazar and Semret [29] have shown that a certain form of
the Nash equilibrium holds when the progressive second
price auction is applied by independent sellers on each
link of a network with arbitrary topology. The studies of
[31-33] study rules and structure of games such that their
outcomes achieve certain objectives.
Huiping and Junde [34] propose a strategy proof trust
management system ﬁtting to wireless ad hoc networks.
Pal and Tardos [35] have developed a general method
for turning a primal-dual algorithm into a group strat-
egy proof cost-sharing mechanism. The authors of [36,37]
have called nodes selﬁsh if they are owned by independent
users and their only objective is to maximize their individ-
ual goals. The article presents a game theoretic framework
for truthful broadcast protocol and strategy proof pric-
ing mechanism. Guanxiang et al. [38] have proposed an
auction-based admission control and pricing mechanism
for priority services, where each user pays a congestion
fee for the external eﬀect caused by their participation.
The mechanism is proved to be strategy proof and eﬃ-
cient. Wang and Li [39] have addressed the issue of user
cooperation in selﬁsh and rational wireless networks using
an incentive approach. They have presented a strategy
proof pricing mechanism for the unicast problem. The
authors of [40,41] have provided a tutorial on mechanism
design and attempt to apply it to concepts in engineer-
ing. Huang et al. [42,43] have utilized SINR and power
auctions to allocate resources in a wireless scenario and
present an asynchronous distributed algorithm for updat-
ing power levels and prices to characterize convergence
using supermodular game theory. Wu et al. [44] have
proposed a repeated spectrum sharing game with cheat-
proof strategies. They propose speciﬁc cooperation rules
based on maximum total throughout and proportional
fairness criteria. Sharma and Teneketzis [45] have pre-
sented a decentralized algorithm to allocated transmission
powers, such that the algorithm takes into account the
externalities generated to the other users. Kakhbod and
Teneketzis [46] consider a decentralized bandwidth/rate
allocation problem in unicast service provisioning. They
present a mechanism, which is implementable in Nash
equilibrium, individually rational and budget balanced.
Procaccia and Tennenholtz [47] advocate the reconsider-
ation of highly structured optimization problems in the
context of mechanism design. They argue that, in cer-
tain domains, approximation can be leveraged to obtain
truthfulness without resorting to payments.
Conclusions
The article investigates certain desirable and natu-
ral properties of SCFs representing resource allocation
strategies for interference coupled wireless systems. The
property of non-manipulation and Pareto optimality of
the resource allocation strategies is captured by the
properties of strategy proofness and eﬃciency of the
SCF, respectively. We introduce the certain desirable
and natural properties of resource allocation strategies,
namely (strong) intuitive fairness and non-participation.
We prove that there are certain inconsistencies, among
the properties of strategy proofness, eﬃciency, (strong)
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intuitive fairness, non-participation, and continuity. These
inconsistencies result in certain limitations while having
algorithmic implementations and certain analytical inves-
tigations of these resource allocation strategies. Hence, it
can be observed that non-manipulation and Pareto opti-
mality of the resource allocation strategies are stringent
requirements and along with certain other desirable prop-
erties is not always implementable. It has been shown that
the only permissible SCF representing a resource allo-
cation strategy in interference coupled wireless systems,
which can be implemented in either Nash equilibrium or
dominant strategy is the trivial constant function.
Appendix
Interference functions
Deﬁnition 14. Interference functions: We say that I :
RK+1+ → R+ is an interference function if the following
axioms are fulﬁlled:
A1 conditional positivity I(p) > 0 if p > 0
A2 scale invariance I(αp) = αI(p),∀α ∈ R+
A3 monotonicity I(p) ≥ I(pˆ) if p ≥ pˆ
A4 strict monotonicity I(p) > I(pˆ) if p ≥ pˆ,
pK+1 > pˆK+1.
Note that we require that I(p) is strictly monotonic
with respect to the last component pK+1. An example is
I(p) = vTp+σ 2, where v ∈ RK+ is a vector of interference
coupling coeﬃcients. The axiomatic framework A1–A4
is connected with the framework of standard interference
functions [2].
Deﬁnition 15. Standard interference functions: A func-
tion Y : RK+ → R++ is said to be a standard interference
function if the following axioms are fulﬁlled:
Y1 positivity Y (p) > 0, for all p ∈ RK+,
Y2 scalability Y (αp) < αY (p), for all α > 1,
Y3 monotonicity Y (p) ≥ Y (pˆ) if p ≥ pˆ.
For any constant noise power pK+1 = σ 2 the func-
tion Y (p) = I(p) is standard. Conversely, any standard
interference. function can be expressed within the frame-
work A1–A4. The details about the relationship between
the model A1–A4 and Yates’ standard interference func-
tionswere discussed in [3] and further investigated in [48].
For the purpose of this article, it is suﬃcient to be aware
that there exists a connection between these two models
and the results of this article are applicable to standard
interference functions.
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